[IANAxfer@apnic] CCWG Report -- Issues of interest to the numbers community

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  • Subject: [IANAxfer@apnic] CCWG Report -- Issues of interest to the numbers community
  • From: Izumi Okutani <izumi@nic.ad.jp>
  • Date: Tue, 19 May 2015 23:16:03 +0900
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    • Dear Colleagues,
      The Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability
      (CCWG) has published a Draft Report that contains its initial Draft
      Proposal. The Draft Report can be found here:
      CCWG-Accountability Draft Report (without annexes):
      [PDF, 1.72 MB]
      CCWG-Accountability Draft Report (with annexes):
      [PDF, 2.05 MB]
      The ASO representatives encourage the numbers community to review and
      give feedback on any specific points in the Draft Report, and reply to
      the questions listed in the document.
      At the same time we would like to draw the numbers community’s attention
      to the following matters, as we believe that they are of interest to the
      numbers community and we would appreciate the community's feedback.
      As an additional reference, the RIPE community had its discussions at RIPE70 meeting last week, including the possible impact of delaying timeline of the IANA Stewardship Transition if the CCWG has too many ICANN Accountability requirements are defined to be addressed before the transition, which are not directly related to the stewardship transition of the IANA Functions. You can see more details at: https://ripe70.ripe.net/archives/video/211/
      1. Revised Mission
      The CCWG suggests clarifications on the description of ICANN’s mission
      (more details in section 3.1 of the Draft Report). During the drafting
      process the ASO representatives provided a tentative description of
      ICANN’s mission in regard to the coordination of policy development for
      Internet number resources (page 20, paragraph 57). The tentative
      description reads as follows:
      “In this role, with respect to IP addresses and AS numbers, ICANN’s
      Mission is described in the ASO MoU between ICANN and RIRs.”
      Do you feel that this description is accurate?
      2. Revised Commitments and Core Values
      The CCWG proposes an amendment to one of the core values of the Bylaws
      (page 25, paragraph 89). The proposed amendment reads as follows:
      “Employ open, transparent and bottom-up, [private sector led
      multistakeholder] policy development processes that (i) seeks input from
      the public, for whose benefit ICANN shall in all events act, (ii)
      promote well- informed decisions based on expert advice, and (iii)
      ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy
      development process;”
      Given that the RIR global policies are described as open, transparent
      and bottom-up, the ASO representatives have a concern on the inclusion
      of the notion of “private sector led multistakeholder”, which is put in
      square brackets. The addition of this notion may lead to uncertainty on
      whether ICANN’s core values include the employment of RIR global policies.
      Do you agree with the removal of the notion “private sector led
      3. US Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws
      The CCWG incorporated some provisions from the Affirmation of
      Commitments relevant to ICANN accountability into the Bylaws (in
      particular regarding ICANN’s Mission and Core Values). The CCWG has
      suggested defining these provisions as "Fundamental Bylaws". The concept
      of Fundamental Bylaws is described in section 3.2 (pp 27-31) of the
      Draft Report. The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is
      that while the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision,
      SO/ACs could block the proposed change (by a 75% vote). On the other
      hand any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs
      (75% vote).
      One of these provisions requires that ICANN “remains headquartered in
      the United States of America”. The CCWG noted that this provision exists
      already in current ICANN Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1:
      “OFFICES. The principal office for the transaction of the business of
      ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United
      States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices
      within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to
      time establish.”
      As the rest of Affirmation of Commitments provisions are suggested to be
      incorporated in the Fundamental Bylaws, the CCWG considered whether this
      provision should also be listed as a Fundamental Bylaw. The comment by
      the ASO Representatives was that while the rest of the Affirmation of
      Commitments provisions incorporated can indeed be seen as fundamental
      principles, the notion of US Headquarters is an administrative issue,
      which would not be considered as fundamental.
      Do you agree with the ASO representatives approach?
      4. Appealing Mechanisms
      The CCWG has proposed enhancements to the two appealing mechanisms
      described in ICANN Bylaws, i.e. the Independent Review Panel and the
      Reconsideration process. The ASO representatives commented that, even
      though the ICANN Board approves its global policies, the processes and
      forums for bottom-up policy development relating to number resources is
      outside of ICANN, and there are separate appealing procedures for
      disputes relating to Internet number resources. In particular there is:
      1.	an arbitration process described in the ASO MoU for disputes relevant
      to the Global Policy development process
      2.	an arbitration process described in the draft Service Level Agreement
      between the five RIRs and IANA Numbering Services Operator for disputes
      relevant to the IANA numbering services.
      3.	A bottom-up process for any concerns that a third party may have
      relating to Internet number resources issues.
      Additionally the ASO representatives noted that it was requested by the
      CWG that decisions regarding ccTLD delegations or revocations would be
      excluded from standing, until relevant appeal mechanisms have been
      developed by the ccTLD community, in coordination with other parties.
      Considering the above, the ASO representatives would propose that any
      appeal mechanism developed by the CCWG should not cover disputes
      relating to Internet number resources.
      5. Powers
      The CCWG suggested that the following powers would ensure community
      Reconsider/reject budget or strategy/operating plans (section 5.2 of the
      Draft Report, pp 47-48) - We would like to note that this power was
      listed as one of the expected accountability mechanisms by the CWG.
      -	Reconsider/reject changes to ICANN Standard Bylaws (section 5.3 of the
      Draft Report pp 48-49
      -	Approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws (section 5.4 of the Draft Report
      pp 49-50)
      -	Remove individual ICANN Directors (section 5.5 of the Draft Report pp
      -	Recall the entire ICANN Board (section 5.6 of the Draft Report pp 52- 53)
      These powers would be exercised by changing ICANN’s structure into a
      membership-based organisation, of which the SO/ACs would be the members.
      Details of this structure can be found in section 5.1.1 of the proposal
      (pp 42-45).
      Do you have any concerns or comments on any of these powers or the
      suggested structure?
      Best Regards,
      Izumi Okutani, an ASO representative for ICANN CCWG