Re: [IANAxfer@apnic] Key elements of the transition of IANA stewardship
Dear David,
Thank you for these good comments.
Please see below.
Best,
Richard
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Conrad [mailto:drc@virtualized.org]
> Sent: vendredi, 12. septembre 2014 18:00
> To: rhill@hill-a.ch
> Cc: ianaxfer@apnic.net
> Subject: Re: [IANAxfer@apnic] Key elements of the transition of IANA
> stewardship
>
>
> Richard,
>
> On Sep 12, 2014, at 1:03 AM, Richard Hill <rhill@hill-a.ch> wrote:
> > What I was trying to say above is that, within the current IP address
> > allocation scheme, the ICANN Board has the ultimate authority.
> ...
> > What I meant to say is that, in the current system, absent the IANA
> > functions contract with NTIA, the ultimate authority, within the system,
> > would be the ICANN Board.
>
> Perhaps the difficulty here is in the definition of “ultimate
> authority”. My dictionary (whatever ships with the US version of
> MacOSX 10.9) defines “authority” as:
>
> 1 the power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce
> obedience;
> 2 a person or organization having power or control in a
> particular, typically political or administrative, sphere;
> 3 the power to influence others, esp. because of one's commanding
> manner or one's recognized knowledge about something.
>
> In the context of Internet numbering, ICANN’s board does NOT have
> power to ‘enforce obedience’ over the RIRs so the first part of
> the definition fails.
Since the RIRs have agreed that their policies are ratified by the ICANN
Board, the ICANN Board does at least nominally make decisions.
>Similarly, ICANN’s board does not have
> power or control over Internet numbering, so the second part
> fails. However, ICANN’s board _does_ have at least some power to
> influence, so from that perspective, I guess ICANN’s board could
> be argued to have some authority.
>
> So, if you’re using the term “ultimate authority” to mean the
> third definition, I’d probably quibble that it isn’t “ultimate”
> in any way, but would agree ICANN’s board can have some influence.
You are right, "ultimate" is not correct, because we all know that
ultimately the ISPs etc. will decide whether or not to use the numbers
publishied by IANA.
What I meant was that, in the decision-making system regarding IP addresses,
ICANN is where the buck stops. That is, nobody (absent the contract with
NTIA) can override ICANN decisions. They can of course refuse to recongize,
or to abide by ICANN decisions, but the ICANN decision itself will stand.
>
> However, that brings us back to the original post that started
> this thread. Given ICANN’s board can’t enforce obedience nor have
> power or control over Internet numbering, I’m unclear as exactly
> what problem you’re trying to solve.
What I proposed was to align the contractual language with what I think
everybody agrees is and should remain the real situation: it is the RIRs who
make IP address policies.
>
> > So, in your view, the RIRs' agreeing that it is the ICANN Board that
> > ratifies their policies does not have any legal meaning or
> effect. You are
> > of course entitled to your views, as is everybody, but I don't
> agree with
> > that view.
>
> Out of curiosity, what meaning/effect do you believe the ICANN
> board ratifying a policy would have?
Somebody must have thought that that had some meaning or effect, otherwise
why did they put it in the MoU?
Conversly, if it has no meaning or effect, why not remove it from the MoU,
so that people like me are not confused?
>Or, suppose the ICANN board
> were to refuse to ratify a policy. What do you believe would be
> the impact?
I do not know the legislative history of that provision. From the plain
meaning of the text, I would presume that a refusal to ratify means that the
policy is not accepted, so the RIRs would have to rework it and submit a
revised version to ICANN for ICANN's ratification.
>
> Regards,
> -drc
>
>