Re: [IANAxfer@apnic] Key elements of the transition of IANA stewardship
Thanks for this and please see below.
Best,
Richard
> -----Original Message-----
> From: John Curran [mailto:jcurran@arin.net]
> Sent: vendredi, 12. septembre 2014 02:05
> To: rhill@hill-a.ch
> Cc: David Conrad; ianaxfer@apnic.net
> Subject: Re: [IANAxfer@apnic] Key elements of the transition of IANA
> stewardship
>
>
> On Sep 11, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Richard Hill <rhill@hill-a.ch> wrote:
>
> >> (b) "ASO is an organic unit of ICANN and therefore ultimately subject
> >> to the authority of the ICANN Board."
> >>
> >> but also:
> >>
> >> (c) "ICANN has the fiduciary duty to be in charge, meaning that the
> >> Board has the fiduciary duty to be the ultimate decision-making
> >> authority."
> > ...
> > I apologize for not being sufficiently clear. (b) and (c) reflect what I
> > think the ICANN Bylaws and the MoU between ICANN and the NRO say.
>
> Richard -
>
> ICANN's bylaws cannot assign "authority for Internet number
> resource policy"
> to itself; if that were true, then any organization could decide
> via language
> in its own bylaws that it was the "authority" for Internet number
> resource
> policy...
Yes, of course they can. Whether that has any effect or not depends on
whether the people who use the resources in question agree.
As we all know, we are in a voluntary system. The IETF publishes standards,
people are free to implement them or not. Within the IETF, the ultimate
decision-making body is the IAB (if I am not mistaken, and excluding
possible interventions by the ISOC Board of Trustees).
What I was trying to say above is that, within the current IP address
allocation scheme, the ICANN Board has the ultimate authority. But of
course it is up to the ISPs etc. to decide whether or not to use the
addresses published by ICANN/IANA.
I would add, however, that the actions of the US government in 1998 did help
to encourage people to rely on ICANN rather than some alternative.
>
> Furthermore, the MOU between ICANN and the NRO reflects an
> agreement between
> the parties; i.e. to the extent that ICANN is reviewing and
> ratifying global
> IP address policy (which are actually developed via the union of
> the regional
> IP policy development processes), it is because the RIRs have
> collectively
> agreed to that review provision.
Correct. But the point is that the RIRs have agreed to be subject to the
ultimate ratification by the ICANN Board.
>
> You've been asserting that this elusive "authority" comes from
> above, i.e.
> ICANN or USG, but completely fail to cite anything that supports
> that view.
I hope that I've now clarified the matter. I never intended to imply that
"authority" comes from above (except of course for the actions of the US
government).
What I meant to say is that, in the current system, absent the IANA
functions contract with NTIA, the ultimate authority, within the system,
would be the ICANN Board.
And of course ISPs etc. could in theory ignore that and use other addresses
or establish another mechanism.
>
> >> The RIRs had such authority prior to ICANN (done via IETF and the RFC
> >> publication series, e.g. RFC 2050), in conjunction with ICANN via the
> >> ASO and global policy development process, and are quite capable of
> >> establishing both regional and global number resource policy in the
> >> absence of ICANN (if such should ever prove necessary.)
> >
> > Correct. As we know, ICANN was imposed by the US government.
>
> Imposed? That is not the case with respect to the Internet
> number resource
> community; we actively participated in the formation of ICANN.
Yes, but as I recall the events, there wasn't really much choice, especially
not after the White Hose allegedly threatned legal action against an alleged
plan to move the root server.
>To
> remind you,
> the US NTIA IANA Function contract statement of work specifically
> precludes
> ICANN from changing any policy established the RIR community in
> section C.8.2
> ("This contract does not authorize the Contractor to make
> material changes
> in the policies and procedures developed by the relevant entities
> associated
> with the performance of the IANA functions.")
Correct. And that is why I think that an equivalent provision has to be
added somewhere, in the ICANN Bylaws and in a new MoU between the NRO and
ICANN.
Otherwise, when the IANA functions contract lapses, there would be no
written clause anywhere that says that the ICANN Board cannot make material
changes in the policies.
>
> > It seems to me that we can now recognize exactly what you say
> above and make
> > it clear that the ICANN Board cannot override RIR decisions.
> But I recognize
> > that you think that this is already clear.
>
> It is already quite clear to the vast majority of folks in this community;
I see that you have written this in your capacity as President and CEO of
ARIN, so I presume that you are expressing an official ARIN view.
But I'm not sure what you mean by "this community". Do you mean the
community comprised of the RIRs? Or are you referring to "the Internet
community", or to the "global multi-stakeholder community"?
> I can't actually imagine any of the involved organizations (NTIA, ICANN,
> IETF, or the RIRs) taking a position to the contrary simply to align with
> your theory (i.e. that ICANN is the "authority" for Internet
> number resource
> policy) but I would welcome you to directly inquire with any of
> them if you
> have any doubt.
I thought that the purpose of these discussions, and of this mailing list,
was precisely to explore this sort of question.
If that is not the case, then that should be made clear. That is, if there
are some pre-determined conclusions that are already agreed, then it might
be good to state them explicitly, so that we don't waste times exploring
forbidden paths.
>
> By the way, if you still want to prop up your theory of that
> "ICANN is the
> USG-imposed authority for Internet number resource policy", you
> might want
> to avoid reading the actual "United States Government’s Internet Protocol
> Numbering Principles" (per USG NTIA) -
> <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2012/united-states-government-s-inte
rnet-protocol-numbering-principles>
>
>"The five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), via their multistakeholder
> processes, are responsible for developing policies for the use of IP
> numbers within their respective specific geographic regions."
This appears in a statement by NTIA. I was referring to the IANA functions
contract, which you cite above.
Since we probably disagree on whether or not a statement by NTIA can
override a contract, I think that we can stop here.
>Upon further review, you'll see that "ICANN" does not appear at all in
>the NTIA statement of IP numbering principles; this shouldn't be all
>that surprising because ICANN's very important role in providing overall
>coordination for the Internet's identifier systems does not equate with
>having "authority" over Internet number resource policy.
So, in your view, the RIRs' agreeing that it is the ICANN Board that
ratifies their policies does not have any legal meaning or effect. You are
of course entitled to your views, as is everybody, but I don't agree with
that view.
FYI,
/John
John Curran
President and CEO
ARIN