Re: [IANAxfer@apnic] Key elements of the transition of IANA stewardship
On Sep 11, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Richard Hill <rhill@hill-a.ch> wrote:
>> (b) "ASO is an organic unit of ICANN and therefore ultimately subject
>> to the authority of the ICANN Board."
>>
>> but also:
>>
>> (c) "ICANN has the fiduciary duty to be in charge, meaning that the
>> Board has the fiduciary duty to be the ultimate decision-making
>> authority."
> ...
> I apologize for not being sufficiently clear. (b) and (c) reflect what I
> think the ICANN Bylaws and the MoU between ICANN and the NRO say.
Richard -
ICANN's bylaws cannot assign "authority for Internet number resource policy"
to itself; if that were true, then any organization could decide via language
in its own bylaws that it was the "authority" for Internet number resource
policy...
Furthermore, the MOU between ICANN and the NRO reflects an agreement between
the parties; i.e. to the extent that ICANN is reviewing and ratifying global
IP address policy (which are actually developed via the union of the regional
IP policy development processes), it is because the RIRs have collectively
agreed to that review provision.
You've been asserting that this elusive "authority" comes from above, i.e.
ICANN or USG, but completely fail to cite anything that supports that view.
>> The RIRs had such authority prior to ICANN (done via IETF and the RFC
>> publication series, e.g. RFC 2050), in conjunction with ICANN via the
>> ASO and global policy development process, and are quite capable of
>> establishing both regional and global number resource policy in the
>> absence of ICANN (if such should ever prove necessary.)
>
> Correct. As we know, ICANN was imposed by the US government.
Imposed? That is not the case with respect to the Internet number resource
community; we actively participated in the formation of ICANN. To remind you,
the US NTIA IANA Function contract statement of work specifically precludes
ICANN from changing any policy established the RIR community in section C.8.2
("This contract does not authorize the Contractor to make material changes
in the policies and procedures developed by the relevant entities associated
with the performance of the IANA functions.")
> It seems to me that we can now recognize exactly what you say above and make
> it clear that the ICANN Board cannot override RIR decisions. But I recognize
> that you think that this is already clear.
It is already quite clear to the vast majority of folks in this community;
I can't actually imagine any of the involved organizations (NTIA, ICANN,
IETF, or the RIRs) taking a position to the contrary simply to align with
your theory (i.e. that ICANN is the "authority" for Internet number resource
policy) but I would welcome you to directly inquire with any of them if you
have any doubt.
By the way, if you still want to prop up your theory of that "ICANN is the
USG-imposed authority for Internet number resource policy", you might want
to avoid reading the actual "United States Government’s Internet Protocol
Numbering Principles" (per USG NTIA) -
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2012/united-states-government-s-internet-protocol-numbering-principles>
"The five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), via their multistakeholder
processes, are responsible for developing policies for the use of IP
numbers within their respective specific geographic regions."
Upon further review, you'll see that "ICANN" does not appear at all in
the NTIA statement of IP numbering principles; this shouldn't be all
that surprising because ICANN's very important role in providing overall
coordination for the Internet's identifier systems does not equate with
having "authority" over Internet number resource policy.
FYI,
/John
John Curran
President and CEO
ARIN