Re: [IANAxfer@apnic] Key elements of the transition of IANA stewardship
On Sep 11, 2014, at 11:56 AM, Richard Hill <rhill@hill-a.ch> wrote:
>>> the MoU between ICANN and IETF.
>>
>> The MOU between ICANN and IETF is for provision of IANA services,
>> and is not
>> a formal designation of "authority" that you seem to be
>> desperately seeking.
>
> I am not seeking any designation of authority. I'm noting that, in my view,
> certain documents establish such authority.
Richard -
For clarity, could identify the "certain documents" and the sections
in each that establish "such authority" with respect to either the
administration of the number resources registries, or with respect to
establishment of policies for the number resource registries?
I am having trouble discerning your actual "view" that from your emails,
as you've alleged so many different things over the last few messages...
You said:
(a) "So wouldn't it be better to clarify the matter, to make it
clear that the ultimate authority for IP addressing is NRO?"
but also:
(b) "ASO is an organic unit of ICANN and therefore ultimately subject
to the authority of the ICANN Board."
but also:
(c) "ICANN has the fiduciary duty to be in charge, meaning that the
Board has the fiduciary duty to be the ultimate decision-making
authority."
as well as saying:
(d) "I agree with you that the source of policy authority is the
community. And that the community has rested that authority
with the RIRs."
which of (a)..(d) above is what you really mean?? And "in your view"
which are the "certain documents" that "establish such authority"?
I hope you can understand why some might have trouble understanding
your vision for how the Internet number ecosystem actually works...
In fairness, let me reiterate my view in quite specific terms:
RFC 2860 establishes that ICANN and the IETF agree that ICANN shall
cause the IANA registries to be administered in accordance with
IETF-produced specifications, including administration of the global
portions of the number resource registries.
The RIR system is recognized by the affected community as having
authority to establish number resource policy, both regionally and
globally.
The RIRs had such authority prior to ICANN (done via IETF and the RFC
publication series, e.g. RFC 2050), in conjunction with ICANN via the
ASO and global policy development process, and are quite capable of
establishing both regional and global number resource policy in the
absence of ICANN (if such should ever prove necessary.)
>> If the IETF were to create a new version of the Internet Protocol
>> (version 42), who would be the "policy authority" for the associated
>> IANA IPv42 number registry (and why?)
>
> I suppose that would depend on the exact nature of the new version, on the
> reasons why it was created, and on what the community thought would be the
> most appropriate policy authority. For example, RFCs 1466 and 1518
> specified certain policies and thus, implicitly, policy authority. The same
> might (or might not) be the case for a future IPv42. Conversely, the number
> registry for IPv42 might well be the RIRs, just as it is for IPv6.
Short answer: The policy for registry administration would be set in the
"IANA Considerations" section of the protocol specification, or in related
document. It might easily recognize that the community would be well served
by having the RIRs perform this role, or it might handle in another manner.
I expect that the IETF, recognizing the such a registry poses "policy issues",
would look for an entity which could establish policy via open, transparent,
and inclusive processes, is accountable (e.g. membership structure) to the
affected community, otherwise agreed to the principles contained in their
IANA framework - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iab-iana-framework-02>
Note that none of the above mentions the USG, NTIA, or ICANN. That's not to
say there may not be an ICANN role; if I were the IAB then I'd probably prefer
it if whatever policy development body that was selected also participated in
ICANN, so that some coordination with the SSAC, RSSAC, GAC, ALAC, etc. could
occur. It might also be cool if the entrusted policy development body were
to periodically be reviewed against its commitment to accountability and
transparency principles every few years, but in the end all of those are
administrative conveniences rather than any relationship of "authority"...
FYI,
/John
John Curran
President and CEO
ARIN