Richard, On Sep 10, 2014, at 1:51 AM, Richard Hill <rhill@hill-a.ch> wrote: > NOTE: this message has been cross-posted individually to the RIR mailing > lists dealing with this issue. (Perhaps it’s only me, but I feel this proliferation of lists dealing with the IANA transition is getting to be a bit much.) > Thus, the ICANN Board has ultimate responsibility for IP address policies. Not really. Ultimate responsibility for IP address policies resides with the ISPs that abide by those policies. I figure the role of ICANN’s Board is primarily to provide a mechanism by which interests outside of the RIR world can provide input into Internet numbering policies. > Up to now, under the IANA functions contract with the NTIA, ICANN was > clearly bound to defer to the RIRs for what concerns IP address policies. While it is true the IANA functions contract requires ICANN to abide by the outcome of RIR policies/processes, that particular clause of the contract was entirely unnecessary (just like the clause discussing protocol parameters). If ICANN did not abide by the outcome of RIR policies/processes, the RIRs had already created an entity (the NRO) that was specifically designed to provide the exact same top-level coordinative service that IANA staff performs (that is, allocating top-level blocks of numbers to the RIRs) should ICANN be unable/unwilling to do so. > If there is no contract between ICANN and some external entity, then ICANN > would have unrestricted ultimate authority over IP addresses. That is, the > ICANN Board could, if it considered it appropriate, override RIR policies. The ICANN Board could also declare Pi = 4. > This puts too much power in the ICANN Board which, under ICANN's current > structure, is not accountable to any external entity. This is a common misunderstanding by folks who come from a world of top-down national law or treaty-based legal fiats to define policies. The Internet numbering world doesn’t work that way. Under the current Internet architecture, all the power resides in the entities that provide value to Internet numbers. The vast majority of that power resides in ISPs who provide routing services. A small amount of power resides in ICANN and the RIRs by their guarantees of uniqueness and by providing access to registration data. ICANN (and the RIRs) is ultimately accountable to the folks who make use of those uniqueness and registration services. If ICANN (or the RIRs) screw up sufficiently, they’ll simply be replaced. The entire Internet numbering administrative hierarchy is merely a way of avoiding ISPs having to enter into a myriad bilateral agreements about who “owns” what parts of the address space. ICANN and the RIRs provide a _coordinative_ service, ensuring address space assignments are not duplicated and that network operators can identify who “owns” a particular block of addresses. In that light, the concerns about ICANN running amok and overriding RIR policy is simply FUD spreading. If you don’t believe me, try the following (reductio ad absurdum) thought experiment: Assume, for sake of argument, that the ICANN Board go stark raving mad and decides to revoke all IPv4 allocations. They instruct ICANN staff to erase the text file that represents the existing ICANN-maintained registry for IPv4 addresses and have the IANA whois server return “unallocated” for every IPv4 query (I wonder how many people even know that IANA provides a whois server for top-level IP address blocks). Beyond the folks who will be hired to provide complete custodial care for the ICANN Board members (and political bodies who will try to take advantage of the situation), who would actually care? Would any operational body even notice? Do you believe ISPs will spontaneously decide to terminate routing service for the IPv4 address space they announce? Regards, -drc (ICANN CTO but speaking only for myself)
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