[apops] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software TCP Denial of Servic

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  • Subject: [apops] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability
  • From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt at cisco dot com>
  • Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2010 18:26:32 -0400
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      Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software TCP Denial of Service
      Vulnerability
      
      Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100812-tcp
      
      http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100812-tcp.shtml
      
      Revision 1.0
      
      For Public Release 2010 August 12 2130 UTC (GMT)
      
      +---------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Summary
      =======
      
      Cisco IOS Software Release, 15.1(2)T is affected by a denial of
      service (DoS) vulnerability during the TCP establishment phase. The
      vulnerability could cause embryonic TCP connections to remain in a
      SYNRCVD or SYNSENT state. Enough embryonic TCP connections in these
      states could consume system resources and prevent an affected device
      from accepting or initiating new TCP connections, including any
      TCP-based remote management access to the device.
      
      No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker
      does not need to complete a three-way handshake to trigger this
      vulnerability; therefore, this this vunerability can be exploited using
      spoofed packets. This vulnerability may be triggered by normal network
      traffic.
      
      Cisco has released Cisco IOS Software Release 15.1(2)T0a to address this
      vulnerability.
      
      This advisory is posted at
      http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100812-tcp.shtml.
      
      Affected Products
      =================
      
      This vulnerability affects only Cisco IOS Software Release 15.1(2)T. No
      other Cisco IOS Software Releases are affected. Cisco IOS XE Software,
      Cisco IOS XR Software, and Cisco NX-OS Software are not affected by this
      vulnerability.
      
      Vulnerable Products
      +------------------
      
      A Cisco device is vulnerable when it is running Cisco IOS Software
      Release 15.1(2)T. To determine the Cisco IOS Software Release that is
      running on a Cisco product, administrators can log in to the device
      and issue the "show version" command to display the system banner.
      The system banner confirms that the device is running Cisco IOS
      Software by displaying text similar to "Cisco Internetwork Operating
      System Software" or "Cisco IOS Software." The image name displays in
      parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS Software Release
      name. Other Cisco devices do not have the "show version" command or may
      provide different output.
      
      The following example identifies a Cisco product that is running
      Cisco IOS Software Release 15.1(2)T with an installed image name of
      C2800NM-ENTSERVICES-M:
      
          Router#show version
          Cisco IOS Software, 2800 Software (C2800NM-ENTSERVICES-M), Version 15.1(2)T,
              RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
          Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
          Copyright (c) 1986-2010 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
          Compiled Mon 19-Jul-10 16:38 by prod_rel_team
      
          <output truncated>
      
      Additional information about Cisco IOS Software Release naming
      conventions is available in the White Paper: Cisco IOS Reference Guide.
      
      Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
      +--------------------------------
      
      No other Cisco IOS Software versions are affected by this vulnerability.
      
      No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
      vulnerability.
      
      Details
      =======
      
      TCP provides reliable data transmission services in packet-switched
      network environments. TCP corresponds to the transport layer (Layer
      4) of the OSI reference model. Among the services TCP provides are
      stream data transfer, reliability, efficient flow control, full-duplex
      operation, and multiplexing.
      
      When TCP connections are terminated in Cisco IOS Software, they are
      allocated a transmission control block (TCB). All allocated TCBs,
      associated TCP port numbers, and the TCP state are displayed in the
      output of the "show tcp brief all" command-line interface (CLI) command.
      
      Cisco IOS Software version 15.1(2)T contains a vulnerability that could
      cause an embryonic TCP connection to remain in SYNRCVD or SYNSENT
      state without a further TCP state transition. Examining the output of
      the "show tcp brief all" command multiple times will indicate if TCP
      sessions remain in one of these states.
      
      This vulnerability is triggered only by TCP traffic that is terminated
      by or originated from the device. Transit traffic will not trigger this
      vulnerability.
      
      Both connections to and from the router could trigger this
      vulnerability. An example of a connection to the router is that you may
      still be able to ping the device, but fail to establish a TELNET or SSH
      connection to the device. For example, an administrator may still be
      able to ping the device but fail to establish a Telnet or SSH connection
      to the device. Administrators who attempt a Telnet or a SSH connection
      to a remote device from the CLI prompt will encounter a hung session
      and the "Trying <ip address|hostname> ..." prompt. The connection
      that is initiated or terminated by the router can be removed from the
      socket table by clearing the associated TCB with the "clear tcp tcb
      0x<address>" command.
      
      Devices could be vulnerable if examining the output of the CLI command
      "debug ip tcp transactions", displays the error messages "connection
      queue limit reached: port <port number>" or "No wild listener: port
      <port number>".
      
      Devices could also be vulnerable if output from repetitive show tcp
      brief all CLI commands indicates many TCBs in the state SYNRCVD or
      SYNSENT.
      
      The following example shows a device that has several HTTP, SSH, and
      Telnet sessions in the TCP SYNRCVD state:
      
          Example#show tcp brief all
          TCB       Local Address               Foreign Address             (state)
          07C2D6C8  192.168.0.2.443             192.168.0.5.11660           SYNRCVD
          07C38128  192.168.0.2.23              192.168.0.5.35018           SYNRCVD
          07C2DD60  192.168.0.2.443             192.168.0.5.19316           SYNRCVD
          07C2A8A0  192.168.0.2.80              192.168.0.5.13818           SYNRCVD
      
          <output truncated>
      
      Any TCP sessions can be cleared by clearing the associated TCB with
      "clear tcp tcb 0x<address>". Alternatively Administrators can clear all
      TCBs at once by issuing "clear tcp tcb *".
      
      Note: This will clear all active and hung TCP connections.
      
      This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco bug ID CSCti18193. This
      vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
      (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2827.
      
      Some TCP application specific information is provided in the following
      sections:
      
      Telnet and SSH
      +-------------
      
      Telnet can not be explicitly disabled on a Cisco IOS device. Configuring
      "transport input none" on the vty lines of a vulnerable device will
      prevent it from being exploited on TCP port 23. However, if the Cisco
      IOS SSH server feature is configured on the device, "transport input
      none" will not prevent the device from being exploited on TCP port 22.
      
      Configuration of vty access control lists can partially mitigate this
      vulnerability because the vulnerability can be exploited using spoofed
      IP source addresses.
      
      Border Gateway Protocol
      +----------------------
      
      Routers that are configured with Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) can be
      protected further by using the Generalized Time to Live (TTL) Security
      Mechanism (GTSM) feature. GTSM allows users to configure the expected
      TTL of a packet between a source and destination address. Packets that
      fail the GTSM check will be dropped before TCP processing occurs, which
      prevents an attacker from exploiting this vulnerability through BGP.
      GTSM is implemented with the command "ttl-security hops".
      
      Further information on protecting BGP can be found in
      "Protecting Border Gateway Protocol for the Enterprise"
      (http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/protecting_bgp.html#7).
      
      TCP MD5 Authentication for BGP does not prevent this vulnerability from
      being exploited.
      
      Vulnerability Scoring Details
      =============================
      
      Cisco has provided a score for the vulnerability in this advisory based
      on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
      this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
      
      CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
      severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
      
      Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
      compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
      vulnerability in individual networks.
      
      Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
      at:
      
      http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
      
      Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
      environmental impact for individual networks at:
      
      http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
      
      
      * CSCti18193 ("TCP connections never timeout in IOS 15.1(2)T")
      
      CVSS Base Score - 7.8
          Access Vector -            Network
          Access Complexity -        Low
          Authentication -           None
          Confidentiality Impact -   None
          Integrity Impact -         None
          Availability Impact -      Complete
      
      CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
          Exploitability -           Functional
          Remediation Level -        Official-Fix
          Report Confidence -        Confirmed
      
      
      Impact
      ======
      
      Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may prevent some TCP
      applications on Cisco IOS Software from accepting any new connections.
      Exploitation could also prevent remote access to the affected system
      via the vtys. Remote access to the affected device via out-of-band
      connectivity to the console port should still be available.
      
      Software Versions and Fixes
      ===========================
      
      When considering software upgrades, also consult
      http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
      exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
      
      In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
      devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
      hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
      properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
      the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
      maintenance provider for assistance.
      
      Each row of the Cisco IOS Software table (below) names a Cisco IOS
      release train. If a release train is vulnerable, then the earliest
      possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date
      of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed
      Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates
      the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities
      at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given
      train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than
      the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends
      upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the
      "Recommended Releases" column of the table.
      
      +---------------------------------------+
      |   Major    | Availability of Repaired |
      |  Release   |         Releases         |
      |------------+--------------------------|
      |  Affected  |                          |
      | 12.x-Based |   First Fixed Release    |
      |  Releases  |                          |
      |------------+--------------------------|
      | 12.0 -     | 12.0 through 12.4 based  |
      | 12.4       | releases are not         |
      |            | affected                 |
      |------------+--------------------------|
      |  Affected  |                          |
      | 15.0-Based |   First Fixed Release    |
      |  Releases  |                          |
      |------------+--------------------------|
      | 15.0       | There are no affected    |
      |            | 15.0 based releases      |
      |------------+--------------------------|
      |  Affected  |                          |
      | 15.1-Based |   First Fixed Release    |
      |  Releases  |                          |
      |------------+--------------------------|
      |            | 15.1(2)T0a               |
      |            |                          |
      |            | 15.1(2)T1; available on  |
      |            | 20-AUG-2010              |
      | 15.1T      |                          |
      |            | Releases prior to 15.1   |
      |            | (2)T are not vulnerable. |
      |            | The vulnerability is     |
      |            | first fixed in release   |
      |            | 15.1(2)T0a.              |
      +---------------------------------------+
      
      Workarounds
      ===========
      
      The only complete workaround to mitigate this vulnerability is to
      disable the specific features that make a device vulnerable, if this
      action is feasible.
      
      Allowing only legitimate devices to connect to affected devices will
      help limit exposure to this vulnerability. Refer to the following
      Control Plane Policing and Configuring Infrastructure Access Lists
      subsections for further details. Because a TCP three-way handshake
      is not required, the mitigation must be combined with anti-spoofing
      measures on the network edge to increase effectiveness.
      
      Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the
      network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion
      document for this advisory, which is available at the following link:
      
      http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100812-tcp.shtml
      
      Cisco Guide to Harden Cisco IOS Devices
      +--------------------------------------
      
      The Cisco Guide to Harden Cisco IOS Devices provides examples of many
      useful techniques to mitigate TCP state manipulation vulnerabilities.
      These include:
      
        * Infrastructure Access Control Lists (iACL)
        * Receive Access Control Lists (rACL)
        * Transit Access Control Lists (tACL)
        * vty Access Control Lists
        * Control Plane Policing (CoPP)
        * Control Plane Protection (CPPr)
      
      For more information on these topics, consult
      "Cisco Guide to Harden Cisco IOS Devices"
      (http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_tech_note09186a0080120f48.shtml).
      
      CoPP
      +---
      
      For devices that need to offer TCP services, administrators can use
      CoPP to block TCP traffic from untrusted sources that is destined
      to the affected device. Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.0S, 12.2SX,
      12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T support the CoPP feature. CoPP may be
      configured on a device to protect the management and control planes
      and minimize the risk and effectiveness of direct infrastructure
      attacks by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to
      infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and
      configurations. The following example can be adapted to specific network
      configurations:
      
          !
          !-- The 192.168.1.0/24 network and the 172.16.1.1 host are trusted.
          !-- Everything else is not trusted. The following access list is used
          !-- to determine what traffic needs to be dropped by a control plane
          !-- policy (the CoPP feature.) If the access list matches (permit),
          !-- then traffic will be dropped. If the access list does not
          !-- match (deny), then traffic will be processed by the router.
          !-- Note that TCP ports 22 and 23 are examples; this 
          !-- configuration needs to be expanded to include all used
          !-- TCP ports.
          !
          access-list 100 deny tcp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 22
          access-list 100 deny tcp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 23
          access-list 100 deny tcp host 172.16.1.1 any eq 22
          access-list 100 deny tcp host 172.16.1.1 any eq 23
          access-list 100 permit tcp any any
      
          !
          !-- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and Layer4
          !-- traffic in accordance with existing security policies and
          !-- configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent
          !-- to infrastructure devices.
          !-- Create a class map for traffic that will be policed by
          !-- the CoPP feature.
          !
          class-map match-all drop-tcp-class
            match access-group 100
      
          !
          !-- Create a policy map that will be applied to the
          !-- Control Plane of the device, and add the "drop-tcp-traffic"
          !-- class map.
          !
          policy-map control-plane-policy
           class drop-tcp-class
            drop
      
          !
          !-- Apply the policy map to the control plane of the
          !-- device.
          !
          control-plane
           service-policy input control-plane-policy
      
      Warning: Because a TCP three-way handshake is not required to exploit
      this vulnerability, it is possible to spoof the IP address of the
      sender, which could defeat access control lists (ACLs) that permit
      communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses.
      
      In the preceding CoPP example, the access control entries (ACEs)
      that match the potential exploit packets with the "permit" action
      result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop"
      function, while packets that match the "deny" action (not shown)
      are not affected by the policy-map drop function. Additional
      information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can
      be found at "Control Plane Policing Implementation Best Practices"
      (http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html)
      and "Control Plane Policing"
      (http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gtrtlimt.html).
      
      Configuring iACLs
      +----------------
      
      Although it is often difficult to block traffic that transits a
      network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be
      allowed to target infrastructure devices and block that traffic
      at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered
      a network security best practice and should be considered as a
      long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround
      for this specific vulnerability. The white paper "Protecting
      Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists"
      (http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801afc76.shtml)
      presents guidelines and recommended deployment
      techniques for infrastructure protection ACLs.
      
      BGP Considerations
      +----------------
      
      GTSM can help prevent exploitation of this vulnerability by
      means of the BGP port because packets that originate from
      devices that do not pass the TTL check configured by GTSM are
      dropped before any TCP processing occurs. For information
      on GTSM refer to "BGP Support for TTL Security Check"
      (http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t7/feature/guide/gt_btsh.html)
      and "BGP Time To Live Security Check"
      (http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/protecting_bgp.html#7).
      
      Embedded Event Manager (EEM)
      +---------------------------
      
      A Cisco IOS Embedded Event Manager (EEM) policy that is based on Tool
      Command Language (Tcl) can be used on vulnerable Cisco IOS devices to
      identify and detect a hung, extended, or indefinite TCP connection
      that is caused by this vulnerability. The policy allows administrators
      to monitor TCP connections on a Cisco IOS device. When Cisco IOS EEM
      detects potential exploitation of this vulnerability, the policy can
      trigger a response by sending a syslog message or a Simple Network
      Management Protocol (SNMP) trap to clear the TCP connection. The example
      policy provided in this document is based on a Tcl script that monitors
      and parses the output from two commands at defined intervals, produces a
      syslog message when the monitor threshold reaches its configured value,
      and can reset the TCP connection.
      
      The Tcl script is available for download at the "Cisco
      Beyond: Embedded Event Manager (EEM) Scripting Community"
      (http://www.cisco.com/go/ciscobeyond) at the following link
      http://forums.cisco.com/eforum/servlet/EEM?page=eem&fn=script&scriptId=2041,
      and the device sample configuration is provided below.
      
          !
          !-- Location where the Tcl script will be stored
          !
          event manager directory user policy disk0:/eem
      
          !
          !-- Define variable and set the monitoring interval
          !-- as an integer (expressed in seconds)
          !
          event manager environment EEM_MONITOR_INTERVAL 60
      
          !
          !-- Define variable and set the threshold value as
          !-- an integer for the number of retransmissions
          !-- that determine if the TCP connection is hung
          !-- (a recommended value to use is 15)
          !
          event manager environment EEM_MONITOR_THRESHOLD 15
      
          !
          !-- Define variable and set the value to "yes" to
          !-- enable the clearing of hung TCP connections
          !
          event manager environment EEM_MONITOR_CLEAR yes
      
          !
          !-- Define variable and set to the TCP connection
          !-- state or states that script will monitor, which
          !-- can be a single state or a space-separated list
          !-- of states
          !
          event manager environment EEM_MONITOR_STATES SYNRCVD SYNSENT
      
          !
          !-- Register the script as a Cisco EEM policy
          !
          event manager policy monitor-sockets.tcl
      
      
      Obtaining Fixed Software
      ========================
      
      Cisco has released free software updates that address this
      vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
      their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
      compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
      
      Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
      sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
      or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
      bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
      http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
      or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
      http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
      
      Do not contact psirt at cisco dot com or security-alert at cisco dot com for software
      upgrades.
      
      Customers with Service Contracts
      +-------------------------------
      
      Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
      regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
      should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
      website at http://www.cisco.com.
      
      Customers without Service Contracts
      +----------------------------------
      
      Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
      contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
      unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
      should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
      Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
      
        * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
        * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
        * e-mail: tac at cisco dot com
      
      Customers should have their product serial number available and be
      prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
      free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
      through the TAC.
      
      Refer to
      http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
      for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
      numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
      languages.
      
      Exploitation and Public Announcements
      =====================================
      
      The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
      use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
      
      This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer.
      
      Status of this Notice: FINAL
      ============================
      
      THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
      ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
      MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
      INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
      AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
      DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
      
      A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
      the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
      and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
      
      Distribution
      ============
      
      This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
      
      http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100812-tcp.shtml
      
      In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
      clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
      e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
      
        * cust-security-announce at cisco dot com
        * first-bulletins at lists dot first dot org
        * bugtraq at securityfocus dot com
        * vulnwatch at vulnwatch dot org
        * cisco at spot dot colorado dot edu
        * cisco-nsp at puck dot nether dot net
        * full-disclosure at lists.grok dot org dot uk
        * comp.dcom.sys.cisco at newsgate dot cisco dot com
      
      Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
      worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
      lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
      to check the above URL for any updates.
      
      Revision History
      ================
      
      +------------------------------------------------------------+
      | Revision 1.0  | 2010-August-12  | Initial public release.  |
      +------------------------------------------------------------+
      
      Cisco Security Procedures
      =========================
      
      Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
      in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
      incidents, and registering to receive security information
      from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
      http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
      This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
      Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
      http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
      
      +--------------------------------------------------------------------
      Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
      +--------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Updated: Aug 12, 2010                             Document ID: 112099
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