On Apr 17, 2009, at 1:36 PM, John Schnizlein wrote:
I think you are right to observe that this, and probably even more
creative, agreements among parties holding IPv4 address blocks are
likely to occur "in the wild" when there are too few addresses for
allocation from the free pools. I doubt that RIR policy will
anticipate and/or control the full variety.
Therefor, the RIRs should give the most attention to keeping the most
accurate records possible of who has the right to use - and therefor
advertise - each block. This priority is relevant because RIRs do not
actually have the ability to "stop transfers", just the ability to
refuse to record them. For the good of the Internet globally, we
should recognize that this priority is more important than any attempt
to induce moral behavior in any region.
John
FWIW I agree with John. I think his description of the situation also
helps to clarify the nature of the key challenge, i.e., how to
maintain "the most accurate possible" registration records, and to
ensure that that quality level (i.e., of completeness, timeliness, and
accuracy of registration records) always meets or exceeds the minimum
required to both (a) preserve general confidence in the uniqueness of
number resources, and (b) fully satisfy the reasonable/legitimate
global demand for identifiability of number resources. If these
benchmarks cannot be maintained, then the Internet functions that
depend on number resource uniqueness will be jeopardized, and/or other
institutions will emerge to satisfy the unmet demand for uniqueness
and identifiability. Thus, this is not (or only secondarily) a moral
issue; it is a fundamental technical and institutional requirement.
The challenge lies in identifying some purely voluntary, private
interest-driven mechanism that could satisfy these minimum technical
requirements over time. One might envision this problem as being
roughly equivalent to the challenge that a society might face if
universal automobile registration were widely regarded as important
(for various reasons, as it is in most countries), but no police-
equivalent existed -- or had ever existed -- to monitor compliance, to
serve as a passive but visible deterrent against non-compliance, and
to take enforcement actions if/when necessary. In the absence of such
a policing mechanism, how might a society that regarded registration
as important seek to realize that objective?
How do APNIC community members expect handle this challenge?
TV
On 2009Apr17, at 1:08 PM, Skeeve Stevens wrote:
I am wondering. 050 is about resource transfers.
But does anyone have an opinion on resource leasing?
Example... I enter into a private agreement with a party to lease
them an AS and the rights to route (or attempt to do so) a /21, and
charge them a yearly fee.
050 stops transfers, but who cares about 050 if there are easier,
simpler ways to accomplish the same thing – but better... I still
own it in the end.
You could even have a broker that leased lots of excess address
space from members for a certain period, and based on the scarcity,
the size of the resource, then sub-leased it to different parties at
rates according to demand at the time – kind of like the real estate
rental market.
I guess the concept of leasing address space is already a standard
one as most ISP’s I know, and in ones I have built, we have levied a
fee on the end customer for larger than the default allocation as a
cost recovery method of our APNIC fees in having them in the first
place.
Thoughts?
policy *
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