In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Apr 2020:
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Apr 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
9498 BBIL-AP 2016-11-01 2020-04-17
55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2020-04-30
24186 RAILTEL 2018-12-08 2020-04-22
45609 BHARTI-MOBILITY 2020-04-06 2020-04-26
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org