In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Jul 2021: ASN Name Fixed-By 138731 KOVAIFN 2021-07-28
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jul 2021: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2016-03-12 2021-07-03 55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2021-07-07 132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2021-07-28 58678 INTECHONLINE-IN 2019-10-04 2021-07-03 45609 BHARTI-MOBILITY 2020-04-06 2021-07-30 134026 ULTRANET 2020-08-27 2021-07-27 138731 KOVAIFN 2020-11-08 2021-07-14 139547 VIMITEL1 2021-04-10 2021-07-29 134674 TATASKYBROADBAND 2021-07-30 2021-07-30
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=ind&no_block=...
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CAIDA Spoofer Project