In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Oct 2019:
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Oct 2019:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2016-03-12 2019-10-12
55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2019-10-31
45415 VASAICABLEPVTLTD 2018-06-07 2019-10-05
132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2019-10-28
18229 CTRLS 2019-01-19 2019-10-16
136331 SHRISAI 2019-10-04 2019-10-16
58678 INTECHONLINE-IN 2019-10-04 2019-10-04
47787 HASHPOWER 2019-10-28 2019-10-28
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org