In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Dec 2019:
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Dec 2019:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2019-12-31
17813 MTNL-AP 2018-02-06 2019-12-18
45415 VASAICABLEPVTLTD 2018-06-07 2019-12-20
132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2019-12-27
10029 SHYAMSPECTRA 2019-11-20 2019-12-26
17488 HATHWAY-NET-AP 2019-12-19 2019-12-19
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org