In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Jul 2020:
ASN Name Fixed-By
24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2020-07-11
55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2020-07-13
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jul 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2016-03-12 2020-07-23
9498 BBIL-AP 2016-11-01 2020-07-21
55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2020-07-30
24186 RAILTEL 2018-12-08 2020-07-26
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org