In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Nov 2021: ASN Name Fixed-By 24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2021-11-05 55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2021-11-13
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2021: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2016-03-12 2021-11-23 55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2021-11-30 132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2021-11-24 138731 KOVAIFN 2020-11-08 2021-11-14 139547 VIMITEL1 2021-04-10 2021-11-30 132960 MNET 2021-09-16 2021-11-01 134004 FOXTEL 2021-11-23 2021-11-23
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=ind&no_block=...
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CAIDA Spoofer Project