In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during May 2022: none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2022: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2022-05-23 132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2022-05-27 134026 ULTRANET 2020-08-27 2022-05-28 138731 KOVAIFN 2020-11-08 2022-05-09 141253 MUFT 2022-04-18 2022-05-30 17917 QTLTELECOM 2022-05-31 2022-05-31
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=ind&no_block=...
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