We received the following email today from our upstream (in India):
> Our transit traffic partners have reported multiple sub-sea cable
> damages on the Atlantic route towards Europe and US east coast. Users
> might face additional latency and occasional packet loss towards these
> destinations.
>
> Our partners are working with relevant authorities and cable sea
> companies for restoration and will take few days to address it. We
> will inform as soon as this is resolved. Inconvenience caused is
> highly regretted.
I've read about cable cuts due to the Tonga volcanic eruption, but the
above as "multiple cable damages" is mentioned as in the Atlantic. Does
anyone know more about this? A news search for "cable cuts" didn't bring
up anything aside from the Tonga story.
Mukund
Hello folks,
Myself, Gaurav Kansal, working as Scientist, in National Informatics Centre, contesting for APNIC’s EC member. Voting will start from tomorrow onwards. I am the sole member contesting from Indian Community.
Soliciting your support and votes.
I will share the “How to vote for APNIC EC Election” document shortly.
Thanks,
Gaurav Kansal
Disclaimer:
This e-mail and its attachments may contain official Indian Government information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and delete this e-mail. Any dissemination or use of this information by a person other than the intended recipient is unauthorized. The responsibility lies with the recipient to check this email and any attachment for the presence of viruses.
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Jan 2022:
none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jan 2022:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2022-01-31
132774 NISSBROADBAND 2017-04-27 2022-01-23
132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2022-01-20
138731 KOVAIFN 2020-11-08 2022-01-26
139547 VIMITEL1 2021-04-10 2022-01-03
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=ind&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
Hi,
For those who may be interested, sharing the CCAOI January 2022 Newsletter
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1INjmg8BLKrMz-xN9uN6NKDADADzFvgdJ/view?usp=…>
for curated #digitalpolicy updates from the Indian Perspective.
This edition covers updates related to #bigtech #antitrust #dataprivacy,
#databreaches, #cybercrime #contentmoderation #internetgovernance
#predictions2022 #TRAI #MeiTY #ICANN #APNIC #InternetSociety #UNIGF #DPB21
and more.
Regards,
Amrita