[sig-routing] prop-059: Using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to construct validated IRR data

[Philip Smith <pfs@cisco.com>]

Dear SIG members

The proposal 'Using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to construct
validated IRR data' has been sent to the Routing SIG for review. It will
be presented at the Routing SIG at APNIC 26 in Christchurch, New
Zealand, 25-29 August 2008.

The proposal's history can be found at:

          http://www.apnic.net/policy/proposals/prop-059-v001.html

We invite you to review and comment on the proposal on the mailing list
before the meeting.

The comment period on the mailing list before an APNIC meeting is an
important part of the policy development process. We encourage you to
express your views on the proposal:

     - Do you support or oppose this proposal?

     - Does this proposal solve a problem you are experiencing? If so,
       tell the community about your situation.

     - Do you see any disadvantages in this proposal?

     - Is there anything in the proposal that is not clear?

     - What changes could be made to this proposal to make it more
       effective?


Philip Smith
Routing SIG Chair
--

________________________________________________________________________

prop-059-v001: Using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to
                construct validated IRR data
________________________________________________________________________


Author:    Randy Bush

Version:   1

Date:      31 March 2008


1.  Introduction
----------------

This is a proposal to introduce a new registry that augments Internet
Routing Registry (IRR) data with the formally verifiable trust model of
the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and provide ISPs with the
tools to generate an overlay to the IRR which is much more strongly
trustable.


2.  Summary of current problem
------------------------------

The current methods for adding or updating Internet Routing Registry
(IRR) data have weak security, and lack an inherently formally
verifiable structure, resulting in a low level of trust in IRR data.

To address the problem of this low level of trust in IRR data, there
have been proposals to use Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to
sign IRR data. The problem with most of the proposed schemes, however,
is that they are conceptually weak and hard to implement due to the
differences between the trust structures of the IRR and the RPKI.

More recently, however, Ruediger Volk has described a very simple method
of using the RPKI that involves no change to the IRR, software that uses
the IRR, or the RPKI.

This is a proposal to implement Ruediger Volk's idea to strengthen the
operators' use of data in the global IRR.


3.   Situation in other RIRs
----------------------------

This proposal has yet to be made in any other RIR.


4.   Details of the proposal
----------------------------

It is proposed that:

4.1 APNIC publish a new IRR that contains 'route' objects generated from
     Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) in the RPKI.

     - This new IRR would accept 'route' objects generated from the
       global RPKI, and would therefore cover the entire routing space,
       in so much as the RPKI covers the global space.

     - Operators who use the IRR to generate routing filters can choose
       to put this new IRR registry logically in front of the other
       registries. Operators can then given preference to routing origin
       information that can be formally validated.

     - This new registry would be made available as an IRR publication
       point.


4.2 APNIC publish an open source tool that enables network operators to
     generate their own overlay IRR publication points themselves.

     - Such generated IRR publication points should be identical to the
       one generated and made available by APNIC.

     - Producing overlay IRR publication points allows security
       conscious operators to have a more formal trust model that
       prevents attacks on the IRR segment generated and served by
       APNIC.


5.   Advantages and disadvantages of the proposal
-------------------------------------------------

Advantages:

- Router filters would be more reliable as they would prefer RPKI
   validated origins, where available, rather than those not validated
   in the RPKI.

   ISPs would achieve this by configuring tools that automatically
   generate router filters to give priority to the IRR publication point
   of the new registry based on RPKI-signed objects.

- The community will have an enhanced ability to filter BGP peer
   prefixes at no additional cost or changes to the data or tool bases.
   This would increase the reliability of the global routing system.

- This new IRR publication point would be much simpler than other
   current ideas about how to use RPKI in conjunction with IRR data.

- This proposal requires no changes to RPSL, the IRR, IRR toolsets, or
   the RPKI.


Disadvantages:

- None are known.


6.   Effect on APNIC members
----------------------------

See 'Advantages' above.


7.   Effect on NIRs
-------------------

None are known.



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